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Browsing by Author "Limbach, Peter"

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    Publication
    Firms’ Rationales for CEO Duality: Evidence from a Mandatory Disclosure Regulation
    (2020-12) Goergen, Marc; Limbach, Peter; Scholz Daneshgari, Meik; https://ror.org/02jjdwm75
    Exploiting the 2009 amendments to Regulation S-K, we provide unique evidence on the first-time disclosure of the reasons firms state for combining or separating the roles of CEO and chairman. The stated reasons support both agency theory and organization theory. They are more numerous, comprise more words, and have a more positive tone for firms with duality. Examining the announcement returns to firms’ disclosures, we find that investors evaluate the most frequently cited reasons for CEO duality by considering the firm’s characteristics. Our evidence enhances the understanding of firms’ endogenous decision to opt for CEO duality and its value consequences.
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    Publication
    Trust and monitoring
    (Elsevier B.V., 2022) Lesmeister, Simon; Limbach, Peter; Goergen, Marc; Vanderbilt University; University of Antwerp ; Ivey Business School; Western University; Agencia Estatal de Investigación; https://ror.org/02jjdwm75
    We show that in countries with more societal trust shareholders cast fewer votes at shareholder meetings and are more supportive of management proposals. This result is confirmed by instrumental variable regressions. It also holds at the U.S.-county level and for voting by U.S. institutional investors. Lower monitoring via voting relates less negatively to future firm performance in high-trust countries,suggesting that managers do not exploit greater discretion when trust is high. We also find a negative relation between trust and bond spreads. Our evidence supports theory arguing that trust substitutes for monitoring and has implications for investors’ optimal monitoring effort. © 2022
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