Person: Qiu, Xiaoyan (Christy)
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Xiaoyan (Christy)
Last Name
Qiu
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IE University
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IE School of Politics, Economics & Global Affairs
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International Relations
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Publication Rebel Strategies and the Prospects for Peace(Wiley, 2022-01-19) Qiu, Xiaoyan (Christy); https://ror.org/02jjdwm75Prominent formal theories of conflict provide considerable insight into how civil wars begin and end, but offer little understanding of how they proceed during wartime. One prevalent pattern is that rebel strategies vary significantly within conflicts over time, from guerrilla to conventional tactics. Why do rebels switch between different fighting strategies? How does the transition affect civil war negotiations? I develop a model of rebel–government negotiation in which rebels choose fighting strategies throughout a multiperiod war. The analysis shows that rebels switch from guerrilla to conventional tactics after gaining strength, and the expectation of growth delays rebels' transition to conventional fighting. The potential switch between different fighting strategies hurts the prospects for peace and prolongs civil wars. I identify the generic conditions under which peace is infeasible, no matter how belligerents negotiate. These conditions characterize the incipient stages of many rebellions, thereby explaining the lack of serious negotiations early on.Publication State Support for Rebels and Interstate Bargaining(Wiley, 2022-10-20) Qiu, Xiaoyan (Christy); https://ror.org/02jjdwm75Since the end of World War II, leaders have frequently supported rebel groups in other countries as a coercive strategy in international disputes. However, the strategic rationale by which rebel groups gain international support is non-obvious. Many recipient groups are too weak to viably win and are hostile to the sponsoring state's goals. Using a formal model, I explain that the fundamental objective of transnational rebel support is to gain bargaining leverage against a rival state by depleting its resources to counter internal and external challenges. This subversive effect provides a sufficient incentive for sponsoring the rebels even when favourable conditions suggested by previous studies are absent. Sponsoring rebels is attractive even if conventional warfare is not comparatively costly and even if rebel and sponsor preferences diverge. Moreover, given the goal of destabilizing rival regimes, potential sponsors prefer to support weaker rebel groups and provide more support to them.