Person: Goergen, Marc
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First Name
Marc
Last Name
Goergen
Affiliation
IE University
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IE Business School
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Finance
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Publication Why female board representation matters The role of female directors in reducing male CEO overconfidence(Science Direct, 2019-09) Goergen, Marc; Chen, Jie; Sau Leung, Woon; Song, Wei; https://ror.org/02jjdwm75We suggest a novel reason why there might be a need for female board representation. Female participation in the boardroom attenuates the CEO’s overconfident views about his firm’s prospects as we find that male CEOs at firms with female directors are less likely to hold deepin-the-money options. Further, we argue that female board representation matters for industries where male CEO overconfidence is more prevalent. We find support for our argument as female directors are associated with less aggressive investment policies, better acquisition decisions, and improved financial performance for firms operating in industries with high overconfidence prevalence. We also identify a market failure around economic crises. Firms that do not have (sufficient) female board representation suffer a greater drop in performance as a result of the crisis than those that have female board representation.Publication Passing the dividend baton: The impact of dividend policy on new CEOs’ initial compensation(Elsevier, 2019-06) Goergen, Marc; Chen, Jie; Song, Wei; https://ror.org/02jjdwm75We examine how firms’ dividend policy affects the initial compensation of their newly appointed CEOs. We focus on newly appointed CEOs to isolate the effect of dividends on compensation and to provide new insights into an aspect largely neglected by compensation research. We show that the dividend payout is positively related to new CEO compensation. Further, the positive effect of dividends is stronger for firms with no dividend cuts over the past two, three and four years, firms with relatively high institutional ownership, and those with strong boards, consistent with new CEOs receiving higher pay as compensation for greater dividend pressure.Publication CEO and director compensation, CEO turnover and institutional investors: Is there cronyism in the UK?(Elsevier, 2019-06) Goergen, Marc; Chen, Jie; Sau Leung, Woon; Song, Wei; https://ror.org/02jjdwm75This paper provides new evidence that correlated abnormal compensation of CEOs and directors is symptomatic of agency problems associated with cronyism. We find that director abnormal compensation has a negative impact on the likelihood of CEO turnover and reduces the sensitivity of CEO turnover to poor stock performance. However, for firms with greater institutional ownership the adverse effects of director abnormal compensation are mitigated, and the negative impact of abnormal compensation on firm performance is reduced. These findings suggest that correlated abnormal compensation of CEOs and directors is likely associated with agency problems.