Person:
Gete, Pedro

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Pedro
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Gete
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IE University
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IE Business School
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Finance
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2021 - 20242
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Author: Ge, Lei × Has files: true ×

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Now showing 1 - 2 of 2
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    Publication
    Credit Stimulus, Executive Ownership, and Firm Leverage
    (INFORMS, 2021-12-14) Gete, Pedro; Chakraborti, Rajdeep; Dahiya, Sandeep; Ge, Lei; Ministerio de Ciencia, Innovación y Universidades; Agencia Estatal de Investigación; European Regional Development Fund; https://ror.org/02jjdwm75
    We show that executive ownership is a significant driver of the demand for credit following credit expansion policies. Our focus on credit demand is in contrast to most studies that have focused on credit supply factors such as bank capital. Our identification exploits the large and unexpected Chinese credit expansion in 2008. This setting offers a unique advantage as in 2008 the Chinese government had almost complete control over the banking sector and it directed the banks to increase credit supply. Thus, in this setting, demand, rather than supply, largely drives the observed changes in firms’ borrowing. We provide extensive robustness tests to validate our results.
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    A model of managerial compensation, firm leverage and credit stimulus
    (Elsevier, 2024-06) Gete, Pedro; Chakraborti, Rajdeep; Dahiya, Sandeep; Ge, Lei; Ministerio de Ciencia, Innovación y Universidades; Agencia Estatal de Investigación; https://ror.org/02jjdwm75
    We study a model in which leverage and compensation are both choice variables for the firm and borrowing spreads are endogenous. First, we analyze the correlation between leverage and variable compensation. We show that allowing for endogenous compensation and leverage can explain the conflicting findings of the empirical literature. We uncover a new channel of complementarity between effort and leverage that induces a correlation sign opposite to what current theoretical models predict. Second, we study the dynamics of leverage and compensation design after a credit stimulus. We derive a set of new empirical predictions. For outward-shifts in credit supply, variable compensation is increasing in leverage growth. Moreover, variable compensation increases after the credit stimulus, especially for firms with low idiosyncratic risk.