Person: Gete, Pedro
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Pedro
Last Name
Gete
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IE University
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IE Business School
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Finance
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Publication What drives housing dynamics in China? A sign restrictions VAR approach(Elsevier, 2015-12) Gete, Pedro; Yang Bian, Timothy; https://ror.org/02jjdwm75We study housing dynamics in China using vector autoregressions identified with theory-consistent sign restrictions. We study seven potential drivers: (1) population increases; (2) a relaxation of credit standards, for example, due to the shadow banking system; (3) increasing preferences towards housing, for example, due to a housing bubble, or to housing being a status asset in the marriage market; (4) an increase in the savings rate; (5) expected productivity progress; (6) changes in land supply; and (7) tax policy, a proxy for policy stimulus. Our results show that, even if all shocks play relevant roles, productivity, savings glut, and policy stimulus have been the dominant drivers. When the sample is closer to 2014, housing preferences and credit shocks increase their importance to explain house prices and volume, while population shocks explain a larger share of the dynamics of residential investment. The results show some differences if we use house price indices constructed by the government or by private sources. The official indices show smaller increases in house prices and assign a smaller role to credit and preference shocks.Publication Compensation contracts and fire sales(Elsevier, 2015-06) Gete, Pedro; Gómez, Juan Pedro; Ministerio de EconomÃa y Competitividad; https://ror.org/02jjdwm75This paper analyzes the impact of remuneration practices on banks’ risk-taking in a model with fire sales externalities. When these externalities are not internalized by a bank's shareholders and executives, borrowing and fire sales are higher than the socially optimal level. Our analysis shows that plain-vanilla equity fails to internalize fire sales externalities. Deferred equity and long-term bonuses unrelated to short-term profits can restore social efficiency. Bail-in bonds can achieve efficiency at a smaller cost since they allow for state-contingent payments. It is not the level but the composition of variable compensation that determines the inefficiency. Excessive regulation may lead to suboptimal levels of risk-taking. Government guarantees reinforce the fire sales externalities and the need for regulation.Publication Distributional Implications of Government Guarantees in Mortgage Markets(Oxford University Press, 2017-07-20) Gete, Pedro; Zecchetto, Franco; Ministerio de EconomÃa y Competitividad; https://ror.org/02jjdwm75We analyze the removal of the credit-risk guarantees provided by the government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) in a model with agents heterogeneous in income and house price risk. We find that wealth inequality increases, driven by higher mortgage spreads and housing rents. Housing holdings become more concentrated. Foreclosures fall. The removal benefits high-income households, while hurting low- and mid-income households (renters and highly leveraged mortgagors with conforming loans). GSE reform requires compensating transfers, sufficiently high elasticity of rental supply, or linking GSE reform with the elimination of the mortgage interest deduction.Publication Mortgage Supply and Housing Rents(Oxford University Press, 2018-12) Gete, Pedro; Reher, Michael; Ministerio de EconomÃa y Competitividad; https://ror.org/02jjdwm75We show that a contraction of mortgage supply after the Great Recession has increased housing rents. Our empirical strategy exploits heterogeneity in MSAs’ exposure to regulatory shocks experienced by lenders over the 2010–2014 period. Tighter lending standards have increased demand for rental housing, leading to higher rents, depressed homeownership rates and an increase in rental supply. Absent the credit supply contraction, annual rent growth would have been 2.1 percentage points lower over 2010–2014 in MSAs in which lending standards rose from their 2008 levels. Received December 21, 2016; editorial decision October 24, 2017 by Editor Philip Strahan. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.Publication Dealing with Overleverage: Restricting Leverage vs. Restricting Variable Compensation(SSRN, 2018-01-25) Gete, Pedro; Gómez, Juan Pedro; https://ror.org/02jjdwm75We study policies that regulate executive compensation in a model that jointly determines executives' effort, compensation and firm leverage. The market failure that justifies regulation is that executives are optimistic about asset prices in states of distress. We show that shareholders propose compensation packages that lead to socially excessive leverage. Say-on-pay regulation does not reduce the incentives for leverage. Regulating the structure of compensation (but not its level) with a cap on the ratio of variable-to-fixed pay delivers the right leverage. However, it is more efficient to directly regulate leverage because restricting the variable compensation impacts managerial effort more than if shareholders are free to design compensation subject to a leverage constraint.Publication Two Extensive Margins of Credit and Loan-to-Value Policies(Wiley, 2016-09-15) Gete, Pedro; Reher, Michael; Real Estate Research Institute ; Ministerio de EconomÃa y Competitividad; https://ror.org/02jjdwm75We analyze a model of mortgage markets, housing tenure choice, heterogeneous agents, and default with closed form solutions. We uncover new insights which may inspire empirical work, and we ground already established insights in a series of tractable expressions. Then we study optimal loan-to-value (LTV) regulation and show that the choice of an LTV cap should balance the opposing forces of access to homeownership and the negative externalities associated with default. Homeownership affordability concerns induce procyclical elements into optimal regulation which attenuate the countercyclical regulation justified by the negative default externalities.