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Diestre, Luis

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Luis
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Diestre
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IE University
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IE Business School
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Strategy
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Author: Barber, Benjamin ×

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Now showing 1 - 3 of 3
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    The Friday Effect: Firm Lobbying, the Timing of Drug Safety Alerts, and Drug Side-Effects
    (Informs, 2020-08-01) Santaló, Juan; Barber, Benjamin; Diestre, Luis; Santaló, Juan; https://ror.org/02jjdwm75
    Safety alerts are announcements made by health regulators warning patients and doctors about new drug-related sideeffects.However, not all safety alerts are equally effective. We provide evidence that the day of the week on which thesafety alerts are announced explains differences in safety alert impact. Specifically, we show that safety alerts announcedon Fridays are less broadly diffused – they are shared 34% less on social media, mentioned in 23-66% fewer news articles,and 12-51% less likely to receive any news coverage at all. As a consequence of this, we propose Friday alerts are lesseffective in reducing drug-related side-effects. We find that moving a Friday alert to any other weekday would reduceall drug-related side-effects by 9-12%, serious drug-related complications by 6-15%, and drug-related deaths by 22-36%.This problem is particularly important since Friday was the most frequent weekday for safety alert announcements from1999 to 2016. We show this greater prevalence of Friday alerts might not be random: firms who lobbied the FDA in thepast are 49-56% more likely to have safety alerts announced on Fridays.
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    Pushing for speed or scope? Pharmaceutical lobbying and Food and Drug Administration drug review
    (Wiley, 2019-04-02) Barber, Benjamin; Diestre, Luis; https://ror.org/02jjdwm75
    We argue firms implementing political activities face a fundamental trade-off between the content and the speed of public officials’ decisions. We show evidence of this trade-off looking at FDA drug approvals: lobbying for broader drugs leads to longer revisions, whereas lobbying to speed up the review process leads to narrower drugs. How do firms respond to this trade-off? We argue firms’ lobbying strategies depend upon the level of IP protection behind their drugs. We predict that firms with high levels of IP protection will lobby for drug scope, whereas firms with low levels of IP protection will lobby for revision speed. We find support for our theory in a sample of 540 new drug applications to the FDA from 1998 to 2015.
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    Publication
    Can firms avoid tough patent examiners through examiner-shopping? Strategic timing of citations in USPTO patent applications
    (John Wiley and Sons Ltd, 2022) Barber, Benjamin; Diestre, Luis; National University of Singapore; University of Groningen; London Business School; Agencia Estatal de Investigación; https://ror.org/02jjdwm75
    Research summary: We claim that,because patent citations influence examiner selection,firms disclose citations strategically to influence which examiner is assigned to their application (“examiner-shopping”). Specifically,firms are more likely to cite patents reviewed by “lenient” examiners in their original information disclosure statement (IDS) (sent before the examiner has been selected),and delay citations to patents reviewed by “tough” examiners to subsequent IDS (sent once the examiner has been selected). We propose this strategy will be implemented by those firms who benefit the most (firms that face patent thickets and are developing high strategic-stakes technologies) but only when the costs are low (when firms face a low probability of patent litigation). We find support to our theory in a sample of 9,763 United States patent and trademark office (USPTO) patent applications during 2000 to 2006. Managerial summary: We find that firms facing patent thickets and developing high strategic stakes technologies try to get more “lenient” examiners to increase the probability of patent approval. The cost of this strategy is that “lenient” examiners usually grant weaker patents that are more likely to be litigated and invalidated. Firms overcome this by using “examiner-shopping” mainly in fields where litigation is relatively infrequent. This behavior has relevant implications: fields where property rights are rarely challenged tend to become “denser” and populated by weaker patents. Our study's discussion of the limitations within the United States patent and trademark office (USPTO) that seem to provide the opportunity to implement “examiner-shopping” strategies provides a path to address this from a policy standpoint. © 2022 The Authors. Strategic Management Journal published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.