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Diestre, Luis

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Luis
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Diestre
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IE University
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IE Business School
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Strategy
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2020 - 20233
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End date: 2023 × Start date: 2020 ×

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Now showing 1 - 3 of 3
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    Publication
    The Friday Effect: Firm Lobbying, the Timing of Drug Safety Alerts, and Drug Side-Effects
    (Informs, 2020-08-01) Santaló, Juan; Barber, Benjamin; Diestre, Luis; Santaló, Juan; https://ror.org/02jjdwm75
    Safety alerts are announcements made by health regulators warning patients and doctors about new drug-related sideeffects.However, not all safety alerts are equally effective. We provide evidence that the day of the week on which thesafety alerts are announced explains differences in safety alert impact. Specifically, we show that safety alerts announcedon Fridays are less broadly diffused – they are shared 34% less on social media, mentioned in 23-66% fewer news articles,and 12-51% less likely to receive any news coverage at all. As a consequence of this, we propose Friday alerts are lesseffective in reducing drug-related side-effects. We find that moving a Friday alert to any other weekday would reduceall drug-related side-effects by 9-12%, serious drug-related complications by 6-15%, and drug-related deaths by 22-36%.This problem is particularly important since Friday was the most frequent weekday for safety alert announcements from1999 to 2016. We show this greater prevalence of Friday alerts might not be random: firms who lobbied the FDA in thepast are 49-56% more likely to have safety alerts announced on Fridays.
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    Publication
    Can firms avoid tough patent examiners through examiner-shopping? Strategic timing of citations in USPTO patent applications
    (John Wiley and Sons Ltd, 2022) Barber, Benjamin; Diestre, Luis; National University of Singapore; University of Groningen; London Business School; Agencia Estatal de Investigación; https://ror.org/02jjdwm75
    Research summary: We claim that,because patent citations influence examiner selection,firms disclose citations strategically to influence which examiner is assigned to their application (“examiner-shopping”). Specifically,firms are more likely to cite patents reviewed by “lenient” examiners in their original information disclosure statement (IDS) (sent before the examiner has been selected),and delay citations to patents reviewed by “tough” examiners to subsequent IDS (sent once the examiner has been selected). We propose this strategy will be implemented by those firms who benefit the most (firms that face patent thickets and are developing high strategic-stakes technologies) but only when the costs are low (when firms face a low probability of patent litigation). We find support to our theory in a sample of 9,763 United States patent and trademark office (USPTO) patent applications during 2000 to 2006. Managerial summary: We find that firms facing patent thickets and developing high strategic stakes technologies try to get more “lenient” examiners to increase the probability of patent approval. The cost of this strategy is that “lenient” examiners usually grant weaker patents that are more likely to be litigated and invalidated. Firms overcome this by using “examiner-shopping” mainly in fields where litigation is relatively infrequent. This behavior has relevant implications: fields where property rights are rarely challenged tend to become “denser” and populated by weaker patents. Our study's discussion of the limitations within the United States patent and trademark office (USPTO) that seem to provide the opportunity to implement “examiner-shopping” strategies provides a path to address this from a policy standpoint. © 2022 The Authors. Strategic Management Journal published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
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    Publication
    Litigate or let it go? Multi-market contact and IP infringement-litigation dynamics
    (Elsevier, 2023-07) Diestre, Luis; Lumineau, Fabrice; Durand, Rodolphe; https://ror.org/02jjdwm75
    We explore how multimarket contact (MMC) explains competitors' intellectual property (IP) infringementlitigation dynamics. We build on role congruity theory to propose that the role played by each firm in shared markets generates expectations about their behavior, determining which of the following dynamics arise: mutual forbearance (low probability of IP infringement and high probability of litigation) or mimetic behavior (high probability of IP infringement and low probability of litigation). We look into two possible roles, imitators and innovators, and claim that (1) mutual forbearance dynamics are more likely to arise when firms play the role of innovators, whereas (2) mimetic behavior dynamics are more likely to arise when firms play the role of imitators. We find support for our predictions in a sample of 813 patent infringement cases in the biopharmaceutical industry. Increasing MMC from one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above the mean leads to a 21.6 (20.6) percent decrease in the probability of infringement and a 22.7 (65.1) percent increase in the probability of litigation after infringement when the rival (focal firm) plays the role of an innovator in shared markets. Alternatively, this increase in MMC leads to a 14.3 % increase (no increase) in the probability of infringement and a 5.2 (16.4) percent decrease in the probability of litigation when the rival (focal firm) plays the role of an imitator in shared markets.