Person: Barber, Benjamin
Loading...
Email Address
Birth Date
Research Projects
Organizational Units
Job Title
First Name
Benjamin
Last Name
Barber
Affiliation
IE University
School
IE Business School
Department
Strategy
Name
3 results
Search Results
Now showing 1 - 3 of 3
Publication My kind of people: Political polarization, ideology and firm location(John Wiley and Sons Ltd, 2024) Barber, Benjamin; Blake, Daniel J.; Agencia Estatal de Investigación; https://ror.org/02jjdwm75Research Summary: With increased political polarization,Americans are displaying more animus across,and affinity within,ideological identity groups. We argue this dynamic incentivizes firms to minimize ideological misalignments across their workforce by locating new establishments in areas that are ideologically proximate to their current operations. We further argue that the desire to minimize ideological distance to new establishments is stronger in knowledge-intensive industries and young organizations. We find support for these arguments through the analysis of over 220,000 new establishment openings from 2009 to 2014. Critically,we find the effect of ideological distance on location is stronger when societal polarization is high. Our theory,and findings,contribute to several literatures and advance our understanding of the impact of polarization on strategy. Managerial Summary: Being a liberal or a conservative is central to many Americans' identity. As political polarization rises,individuals increasingly trust and favor others who share their ideological identity,while distrusting and avoiding those that do not. This study investigates how these societal trends affect where firms choose to locate new facilities. Because social ties and trust across workers support collaboration,resource-sharing and organizational performance,we argue that managers will seek ideological alignment within their firms by locating new establishments in areas that are ideologically proximate to existing operations. Analysis of over 220,000 new establishment openings from 2009 to 2014 supports this contention,and shows that the tendency to avoid ideologically distant locations is stronger when societal polarization is higher. © 2023 The Authors. Strategic Management Journal published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.Publication The Friday Effect: Firm Lobbying, the Timing of Drug Safety Alerts, and Drug Side-Effects(Informs, 2020-08-01) Santaló, Juan; Barber, Benjamin; Diestre, Luis; Santaló, Juan; https://ror.org/02jjdwm75Safety alerts are announcements made by health regulators warning patients and doctors about new drug-related sideeffects.However, not all safety alerts are equally effective. We provide evidence that the day of the week on which thesafety alerts are announced explains differences in safety alert impact. Specifically, we show that safety alerts announcedon Fridays are less broadly diffused – they are shared 34% less on social media, mentioned in 23-66% fewer news articles,and 12-51% less likely to receive any news coverage at all. As a consequence of this, we propose Friday alerts are lesseffective in reducing drug-related side-effects. We find that moving a Friday alert to any other weekday would reduceall drug-related side-effects by 9-12%, serious drug-related complications by 6-15%, and drug-related deaths by 22-36%.This problem is particularly important since Friday was the most frequent weekday for safety alert announcements from1999 to 2016. We show this greater prevalence of Friday alerts might not be random: firms who lobbied the FDA in thepast are 49-56% more likely to have safety alerts announced on Fridays.Publication Can firms avoid tough patent examiners through examiner-shopping? Strategic timing of citations in USPTO patent applications(John Wiley and Sons Ltd, 2022) Barber, Benjamin; Diestre, Luis; National University of Singapore; University of Groningen; London Business School; Agencia Estatal de Investigación; https://ror.org/02jjdwm75Research summary: We claim that,because patent citations influence examiner selection,firms disclose citations strategically to influence which examiner is assigned to their application (“examiner-shopping”). Specifically,firms are more likely to cite patents reviewed by “lenient” examiners in their original information disclosure statement (IDS) (sent before the examiner has been selected),and delay citations to patents reviewed by “tough” examiners to subsequent IDS (sent once the examiner has been selected). We propose this strategy will be implemented by those firms who benefit the most (firms that face patent thickets and are developing high strategic-stakes technologies) but only when the costs are low (when firms face a low probability of patent litigation). We find support to our theory in a sample of 9,763 United States patent and trademark office (USPTO) patent applications during 2000 to 2006. Managerial summary: We find that firms facing patent thickets and developing high strategic stakes technologies try to get more “lenient” examiners to increase the probability of patent approval. The cost of this strategy is that “lenient” examiners usually grant weaker patents that are more likely to be litigated and invalidated. Firms overcome this by using “examiner-shopping” mainly in fields where litigation is relatively infrequent. This behavior has relevant implications: fields where property rights are rarely challenged tend to become “denser” and populated by weaker patents. Our study's discussion of the limitations within the United States patent and trademark office (USPTO) that seem to provide the opportunity to implement “examiner-shopping” strategies provides a path to address this from a policy standpoint. © 2022 The Authors. Strategic Management Journal published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.