Publication: Information, oversight, and compliance: A field experiment on horizontal accountability in Brazil
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Date
2019-06-26
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Abstract
Does the provision of information about local bureaucracies to the politicians who oversee them decrease irregularities and improve bureaucratic effectiveness? Information interventions are appealing because of their solid microeconomic foundations and their relatively low costs. However, recent experimental studies of information campaigns aimed at fostering vertical accountability (between voters and politicians) have found mixed results. Providing information to politicians directly could be more powerful, given politicians’ direct responsibility for allocating and managing resources. Information may be particularly effective when provided by auditing institutions, given politicians’ susceptibility to sanctions by these horizontal accountability actors. I partnered with the audit court of the Brazilian state of Rio Grande do Norte to experimentally study the effects of informing local politicians (both in government and in the opposition) about irregularities and performance in the bureaucracies they oversee. Outcomes are measured using administrative payroll data, a face-to-face survey of bureaucrats, and an online survey of politicians. Preliminary results suggest the treatment reduced the share of workers hired under temporary contracts, increased knowledge about rules among politicians, and changed politicians’ sense of accountability pressure from the state audit court
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Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
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IE School of Politics, Economics & Global Affairs
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Toral, Guillermo and Toral, Guillermo, Information, Oversight, and Compliance: A Field Experiment on Horizontal Accountability in Brazil (June 26, 2019). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3462008 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3462008