Person: Goergen, Marc
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Marc
Last Name
Goergen
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IE University
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IE Business School
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Finance
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Publication Measuring the ownership and control of UK listed firms: Some methodological challenges(Academic Press, 2023) Mira, Svetlana; Goergen, Marc; https://ror.org/02jjdwm75While scholars in business,management,accounting and finance frequently use data on the ownership and control structure of companies in their research,we show that determining this structure for a UK public limited company using publicly available information can be fraught with a number of difficulties. The latest changes to the UK Listing rules following the Hill Review (2021) may further exacerbate these difficulties via the potential increase in listed companies with dual-class shares. With the help of case studies and further empirical work,we demonstrate some of the methodological challenges faced by researchers. We provide guidance on how to tackle these challenges. © 2023 The AuthorsPublication Earnings management around founder CEO reappointments and successions in family firms(Wiley, 2021-11) Goergen, Marc; Ansari, Iram; Mira, Svetlana; https://ror.org/02jjdwm75This paper studies reappointment of a chief executive officer (CEO) and succession events in listed family firms with an incumbent family CEO. We explore whether family firms with a founder CEO are more likely to engage in earnings management preevent than other family firms. We find evidence of preevent upward earnings management for firms that reappoint their founder CEO but no for other family firms. These findings suggest that the costs and benefits from earnings management change around founder CEO reappointments in family firms. Investors, auditors, policymakers and regulators should be aware of the temptation of founder CEOs to inflate earnings preceding their reappointment.Publication The Market for Non-Executive Directors Does Acquisition Performance Influence Future Board Seats(Wiley, 2018-03-23) Goergen, Marc; Mira, Svetlana; O’Sullivan, Noel; https://ror.org/02jjdwm75This paper investigates whether non-executive directors associated with good (bad) board decisions are subsequently rewarded (penalized) in the market for directors. This question is addressed by assessing whether the post-acquisition performance of acquiring companies influences the number of non-executive directorships that non-executives involved in these acquisitions hold subsequent to the acquisition. We find that non-executives on the boards of acquirers that increase (omit or cut) their dividend subsequently hold more (fewer) non-executive directorships in listed companies. Our findings suggest that the non-executive labour market is efficient and rewards (penalizes) non-executives for good (bad) acquisitions.Publication How reported board independence overstates actual board independence in family firms: A methodological concern(Now Publisher, 2018) Goergen, Marc; Ansari, Iram; Mira, Svetlana; https://ror.org/02jjdwm75Despite successive codes of best practice of France, Germany and the UK highlighting the importance of the independence of non-executive directors, the codes tend to ignore the links that directors of family firms might have with the controlling shareholders. This is of particular concern for firms with concentrated family control as the risk of minority shareholder expropriation is greater for such firms. This paper proposes a new measure of board independence for family firms. Using a sample of listed French, German and UK family firms with an incumbent family CEO due for re-appointment or replacement over 2001-2010, we show that our measure of board independence is significantly lower than reported board independence. In contrast to reported board independence, our measure is a good predictor of the type of new CEO succeeding the incumbent CEO. Our results suggest that conventionally defined, or reported, board independence is biased and fails to provide investors, including minority shareholders, with an accurate measure of board independence. This conclusion has important policy implications for regulators and best practice in corporate governance.