Publication: The Market for Non-Executive Directors Does Acquisition Performance Influence Future Board Seats
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Date
2018-03-23
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Wiley
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Abstract
This paper investigates whether non-executive directors associated with good (bad) board decisions are subsequently rewarded (penalized) in the market for directors. This question is addressed by assessing whether the post-acquisition performance of acquiring companies influences the number of non-executive directorships that non-executives involved in these acquisitions hold subsequent to the acquisition. We find that non-executives on the boards of acquirers that increase (omit or cut) their dividend subsequently hold more (fewer) non-executive directorships in listed companies. Our findings suggest that the non-executive labour market is efficient and rewards (penalizes) non-executives for good (bad) acquisitions.
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Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International
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IE Business School
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Citation
Mira, S., Goergen, M., & O'Sullivan, N. (2019). The market for non‐executive directors: does acquisition performance influence future board seats?. British Journal of Management, 30(2), 415-436. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8551.12290.