Publication: Organized Interests and the Mechanisms behind Unequal Representation in Legislatures
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Date
2023-12-07
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Cambridge University Press
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Abstract
How do organized interests contribute to unequal representation in contemporary democracies? We discuss two central channels: the selection of partisan legislators through elections and postelectoral influence via lobbying. We argue that these channels are potentially complementary strategies used by rational actors. Employing a game-theoretic model and simulations of interest group influence on legislative voting, we show that this logic may explain interest group strategies in unequal times. Our model implies that interest group strategies vary with party polarization and it highlights a challenge for empirical research on unequal representation and the literature on lobbying. Using statistical models commonly used in the literature to study biases in legislative voting or policy adoption, researchers are likely to overstate the relevance of elections as a channel through which groups affect legislative responsiveness and understate the role interest groups’ postelectoral influence. Our results stress the importance of theoretical models capturing the strategic behavior of political actors as a guiding light for the empirical study of mechanisms of unequal representation.
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Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International
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IE School of Politics, Economics & Global Affairs
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Becher, M., & Stegmueller, D. (2021). Organized Interests and the Mechanisms behind Unequal Representation in Legislatures. Unequal Democracies, 133. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009428682.008