Publication:
Organized Interests and the Mechanisms behind Unequal Representation in Legislatures

Simple item page
dc.contributor.authorBecher, Michael
dc.contributor.authorStegmueller, Daniel
dc.contributor.editorLupu, Noam
dc.contributor.editorPontusson, Jonas
dc.contributor.rorhttps://ror.org/02jjdwm75
dc.date.accessioned2025-01-14T17:40:00Z
dc.date.available2025-01-14T17:40:00Z
dc.date.issued2023-12-07
dc.description.abstractHow do organized interests contribute to unequal representation in contemporary democracies? We discuss two central channels: the selection of partisan legislators through elections and postelectoral influence via lobbying. We argue that these channels are potentially complementary strategies used by rational actors. Employing a game-theoretic model and simulations of interest group influence on legislative voting, we show that this logic may explain interest group strategies in unequal times. Our model implies that interest group strategies vary with party polarization and it highlights a challenge for empirical research on unequal representation and the literature on lobbying. Using statistical models commonly used in the literature to study biases in legislative voting or policy adoption, researchers are likely to overstate the relevance of elections as a channel through which groups affect legislative responsiveness and understate the role interest groups’ postelectoral influence. Our results stress the importance of theoretical models capturing the strategic behavior of political actors as a guiding light for the empirical study of mechanisms of unequal representation.
dc.description.peerreviewedyes
dc.description.statusPublished
dc.formatapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.citationBecher, M., & Stegmueller, D. (2021). Organized Interests and the Mechanisms behind Unequal Representation in Legislatures. Unequal Democracies, 133. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009428682.008
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781009428682.008
dc.identifier.isbn9781009428682
dc.identifier.publicationtitleUnequal Democracies Public Policy, Responsiveness, and Redistribution in an Era of Rising Economic Inequality
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14417/3452
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherCambridge University Press
dc.relation.departmentComparative Politics
dc.relation.entityIE University
dc.relation.schoolIE School of Politics, Economics & Global Affairs
dc.rightsAttribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International
dc.rights.accessRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/deed.es
dc.subject.keywordUnequal representation
dc.subject.keywordLobbying
dc.subject.keywordCandidate selection
dc.subject.keywordFormal theory
dc.titleOrganized Interests and the Mechanisms behind Unequal Representation in Legislatures
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/bookPart
dc.version.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dspace.entity.typePublication
relation.isAuthorOfPublication64459ea7-0faa-4600-9041-a4f317ab9579
relation.isAuthorOfPublication.latestForDiscovery64459ea7-0faa-4600-9041-a4f317ab9579
Files
Original bundle
Now showing 1 - 1 of 1
Thumbnail Image
Name:
organized-interests-and-the-mechanisms-behind-unequal-representation-in-legislatures.pdf
Size:
344.07 KB
Format:
Adobe Portable Document Format
Download
License bundle
Now showing 1 - 1 of 1
No Thumbnail Available
Name:
license.txt
Size:
2.83 KB
Format:
Item-specific license agreed to upon submission
Description:
Download
Collections
Books & Book chapters