Publication: Turnover: How Lame-Duck Governments Disrupt the Bureaucracy and Service Delivery before Leaving Office
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Date
2024-10
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The University of Chicago press
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Abstract
Electoral accountability is fundamental to representative democracy. Yet, it can also be costly for governance because it generates turnover among bureaucrats (not just politicians) and disrupts the delivery of public services. Previous studies on the connection between political and bureaucratic turnover emphasize how incoming governments reshape the bureaucracy. This article argues that election losers also engage in bureaucratic shuffling before leaving office, and that this can depress public service delivery. I employ a close-races regression discontinuity design to demonstrate these turnover dynamics, using administrative data on the universe of government employees and healthcare services in Brazilian municipalities. The results show that the incumbent’s electoral defeat causes dismissals of temporary employees, the hiring of more civil servants, and declines in healthcare service delivery before the winner takes office. These findings highlight the political strategies of lame-duck politicians and the consequential bureaucratic politics that follow elections.
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Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International
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IE School of Politics, Economics & Global Affairs
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Toral, G. (2024). Turnover: How lame-duck governments disrupt the bureaucracy and service delivery before leaving office. The Journal of Politics, 86(4), 1348-1367. https://doi.org/10.1086/729961.