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Can firms avoid tough patent examiners through examiner-shopping? Strategic timing of citations in USPTO patent applications

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dc.contributor.authorBarber, Benjamin
dc.contributor.authorDiestre, Luis
dc.contributor.funderNational University of Singapore
dc.contributor.funderUniversity of Groningen
dc.contributor.funderLondon Business School
dc.contributor.funderAgencia Estatal de Investigación
dc.contributor.rorhttps://ror.org/02jjdwm75
dc.date.accessioned2024-07-08T13:14:15Z
dc.date.available2024-07-08T13:14:15Z
dc.date.issued2022
dc.description.abstractResearch summary: We claim that,because patent citations influence examiner selection,firms disclose citations strategically to influence which examiner is assigned to their application (“examiner-shopping”). Specifically,firms are more likely to cite patents reviewed by “lenient” examiners in their original information disclosure statement (IDS) (sent before the examiner has been selected),and delay citations to patents reviewed by “tough” examiners to subsequent IDS (sent once the examiner has been selected). We propose this strategy will be implemented by those firms who benefit the most (firms that face patent thickets and are developing high strategic-stakes technologies) but only when the costs are low (when firms face a low probability of patent litigation). We find support to our theory in a sample of 9,763 United States patent and trademark office (USPTO) patent applications during 2000 to 2006. Managerial summary: We find that firms facing patent thickets and developing high strategic stakes technologies try to get more “lenient” examiners to increase the probability of patent approval. The cost of this strategy is that “lenient” examiners usually grant weaker patents that are more likely to be litigated and invalidated. Firms overcome this by using “examiner-shopping” mainly in fields where litigation is relatively infrequent. This behavior has relevant implications: fields where property rights are rarely challenged tend to become “denser” and populated by weaker patents. Our study's discussion of the limitations within the United States patent and trademark office (USPTO) that seem to provide the opportunity to implement “examiner-shopping” strategies provides a path to address this from a policy standpoint. © 2022 The Authors. Strategic Management Journal published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
dc.description.fundingtypeFor comments and suggestions, we are grateful to the Editor and two anonymous reviewers as well as the participants in the seminars of ESMT, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, London Business School, National University of Singapore and the 2021 BizGov conference. Research Reported in this paper was partially funded by State Research Agency (AEI) : 10.13039/501100011033 Grant No. PID2019-111482GA-I00. For comments and suggestions, we are grateful to the Editor and two anonymous reviewers as well as the participants in the seminars of ESMT, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, London Business School, National University of Singapore and the 2021 BizGov conference. Research Reported in this paper was partially funded by State Research Agency (AEI) -10.13039/501100011033 Grant No. PID2019-111482GA-I00.
dc.description.keywordexaminer-shopping
dc.description.keywordinnovation
dc.description.keywordpatent strategy
dc.description.keywordproperty rights
dc.description.keywordregulatory systems
dc.formatapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.citationBarber IV, B., & Diestre, L. (2022). Can firms avoid tough patent examiners through examiner?shopping? Strategic timing of citations in USPTO patent applications. Strategic Management Journal, 43(9), 1854-1871.
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1002/smj.3386
dc.identifier.issn1432095
dc.identifier.officialurlhttps://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85124717724&doi=10.1002%2fsmj.3386&partnerID=40&md5=6626b1d81c23bd740251dff121e39341
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14417/3036
dc.issue.number9
dc.journal.titleStrategic Management Journal
dc.language.isoeng
dc.page.final1871
dc.page.initial1854
dc.page.total0
dc.publisherJohn Wiley and Sons Ltd
dc.relation.departmentStrategy
dc.relation.entityIE University
dc.relation.projectIDAEI: PID2019-111482GA-I00
dc.relation.schoolIE Business School
dc.rightsAttribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International
dc.rights.accessRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
dc.subjectexaminer-shopping; innovation; patent strategy; property rights; regulatory systems
dc.subject.keywordexaminer-shopping
dc.subject.keywordinnovation
dc.subject.keywordpatent strategy
dc.subject.keywordproperty rights
dc.subject.keywordregulatory systems
dc.subject.otherCommerce
dc.subject.otherLaws and legislation
dc.subject.otherTiming circuits
dc.subject.otherTrademarks
dc.subject.otherExaminer-shopping
dc.subject.otherInformation disclosure
dc.subject.otherInnovation
dc.subject.otherManagement journals
dc.subject.otherPatent applications
dc.subject.otherPatent strategy
dc.subject.otherProperty right
dc.subject.otherRegulatory systems
dc.subject.otherStrategic management
dc.subject.otherUnited States Patent and Trademark Office
dc.subject.otherPatents and inventions
dc.titleCan firms avoid tough patent examiners through examiner-shopping? Strategic timing of citations in USPTO patent applications
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.version.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.volume.number43
dspace.entity.typePublication
person.identifier.scopus-author-id55863734200
person.identifier.scopus-author-id37023044400
relation.isAuthorOfPublicationee50c52d-1b33-4b98-bd82-80590a37dd42
relation.isAuthorOfPublication9c2e697b-9b71-43c9-9c90-6d207e4fb494
relation.isAuthorOfPublication.latestForDiscoveryee50c52d-1b33-4b98-bd82-80590a37dd42
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