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Prime ministers and the electoral cost of using the confidence vote in legislative bargaining: evidence from France

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dc.contributor.authorBecher, Michael
dc.contributor.authorBrouard, Sylvain
dc.contributor.authorGuinaudeau, Isabelle
dc.contributor.rorhttps://ror.org/02jjdwm75
dc.date.accessioned2025-01-22T10:25:18Z
dc.date.available2025-01-22T10:25:18Z
dc.date.issued2016-06-23
dc.description.abstractDo prime ministers pay an electoral penalty for using procedural force to pass laws? Influential theories of parliamentary governance and legislative bargaining assume that the use of the confidence vote procedure – parliamentary governments’ most powerful legislative weapon – entails an electoral cost, but evidence on this important claim has been scarce. This article provides the first estimates of how prime ministers’ public approval responds to their use of the confidence vote. Analysing time series data from France 1979–2008, it is found that prime ministers experience a considerable drop in approval after their use of the confidence vote that is not accounted for by standard economic and political covariates. The effect size is similar to a 1 per cent decline in economic growth. The findings help explain French prime ministers’ selective use of the confidence vote procedure. They also suggest that political costs constrain the bargaining power conferred by the confidence vote.
dc.description.peerreviewedyes
dc.description.statusPublished
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dc.identifier.citationBecher, M., Brouard, S., & Guinaudeau, I. (2017). Prime ministers and the electoral cost of using the confidence vote in legislative bargaining: evidence from France. West European Politics, 40(2), 252-274. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2016.1192899
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2016.1192899
dc.identifier.issn1743-9655
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14417/3469
dc.issue.number2
dc.journal.titleWest European Politics
dc.language.isoen
dc.page.final274
dc.page.initial252
dc.page.total22
dc.publisherTaylor & Francis
dc.relation.departmentComparative Politics
dc.relation.entityIE University
dc.relation.schoolIE School of Politics, Economics & Global Affairs
dc.rightsAttribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International
dc.rights.accessRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/deed.es
dc.subject.keywordConfidence vote
dc.subject.keywordGovernment approval
dc.subject.keywordParliamentary government
dc.subject.keywordLegislative bargaining
dc.subject.keywordPrime minister
dc.subject.keywordFrance
dc.titlePrime ministers and the electoral cost of using the confidence vote in legislative bargaining: evidence from France
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.version.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion
dc.volume.number40
dspace.entity.typePublication
relation.isAuthorOfPublication64459ea7-0faa-4600-9041-a4f317ab9579
relation.isAuthorOfPublication.latestForDiscovery64459ea7-0faa-4600-9041-a4f317ab9579
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