Publication:
The Conditional Nature of Political Risk: How Home Institutions Influence the Location of Foreign Direct Investment

Loading...
Thumbnail Image
Date
2018-03-14
Advisor
Court
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
Wiley
Defense Date
Metrics
Citation
Research Projects
Organizational Units
Journal Issue
Abstract
What determines whether countries' institutions attract or deter investment? Although existing theories predict that multinational enterprises (MNEs) avoid locations where institutions cannot constrain public and private actors' opportunistic behavior, we argue host institutions' attractiveness depends on firms' home environment. Home country institutions shape firms' practices and capabilities, thus helping to determine the environments that firms are best prepared to face abroad. We test our predictions using multiple data sets at different levels of analysis: firm-level data on MNEs' foreign subsidiaries, data on bilateral foreign direct investment (FDI) positions, and longitudinal data on bilateral FDI flows. We find that states with independent judiciaries are particularly attractive to investment from countries also possessing independent courts. Similarly, countries with low judicial independence disproportionately send FDI to countries lacking independent judiciaries. These findings' implications challenge conventional wisdom: “Good” institutions may not attract all investors, and “bad” institutions may not always deter, as current research suggests.
Unesco subjects
License
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
School
IE Business School
Center
Keywords
Citation
Beazer, Q. H., & Blake, D. J. (2018). The conditional nature of political risk: How home institutions influence the location of foreign direct investment. American Journal of Political Science, 62(2), 470-485. https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12344