Person: Toral, Guillermo
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Guillermo
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Toral
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IE University
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IE School of Politics, Economics & Global Affairs
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Comparative Politics
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Publication Political Bureaucratic Cycles: How Politicians’ Responses to Electoral Incentives and Anti-Corruption Policies Disrupt the Bureaucracy and Service Delivery around Elections(SSRN, 2019-08-24) Toral, Guillermo; https://ror.org/02jjdwm75A vast literature has studied political cycles in economic outcomes and economic policy tools (political business and political budget cycles, respectively). I identify a related phenomenon, which I call political bureaucratic cycles: electoral cycles in the hiring and firing of bureaucrats and in the activities of public employees, which emerge as a result of the combination of electoral incentives and legal rules imposed to limit the use of public employment for electioneering. Empirically, I leverage administrative, identified, contract-level data on the universe of municipal employees in Brazil between 2002 and 2016 to measure political bureaucratic cycles. Hires and dismissals of municipal personnel show markedly cyclical patterns around elections, which are shaped by both incumbents’ electoral incentives and their reaction to well-meaning anti-corruption policies that constrain hiring and firing around elections. Cycles are most pronounced for temporary bureaucrats but are also detectable for civil service bureaucrats, which counters the received wisdom that civil service regimes isolate bureaucrats from political dynamics. Hiring and firing around elections are targeted at less educated people, which is consistent with political bureaucratic cycles partly responding to clientelistic strategies. Consistent with the clientelistic use of public employment, and the legal rigidities imposed on hiring around elections, pre-natal check-ups (a key output of the healthcare bureaucracy) are systematically lower around elections. Findings are grounded on, and complemented with, in-depth interviews with prosecutors, politicians and bureaucrats conducted in 7 states. The paper contributes to bridging the gap between the literatures on political budget/business cycles and on clientelism, two fields that have rarely been linked before.Publication Turnover: How Lame-Duck Governments Disrupt the Bureaucracy and Service Delivery before Leaving Office(The University of Chicago press, 2024-10) Toral, Guillermo; https://ror.org/02jjdwm75Electoral accountability is fundamental to representative democracy. Yet, it can also be costly for governance because it generates turnover among bureaucrats (not just politicians) and disrupts the delivery of public services. Previous studies on the connection between political and bureaucratic turnover emphasize how incoming governments reshape the bureaucracy. This article argues that election losers also engage in bureaucratic shuffling before leaving office, and that this can depress public service delivery. I employ a close-races regression discontinuity design to demonstrate these turnover dynamics, using administrative data on the universe of government employees and healthcare services in Brazilian municipalities. The results show that the incumbent’s electoral defeat causes dismissals of temporary employees, the hiring of more civil servants, and declines in healthcare service delivery before the winner takes office. These findings highlight the political strategies of lame-duck politicians and the consequential bureaucratic politics that follow elections.Publication Competence versus Priorities: Negative Electoral Responses to Education Quality in Brazil(Harvard, 2020-05-19) Toral, Guillermo; Boas, Taylor; Hidalgo, Daniel; https://ror.org/02jjdwm75Do voters reward politicians for the quality of public services? We address this question by studying voters’ responses to signals of municipal school quality in Brazil, a setting particularly favorable to electoral accountability. Findings from a regression discontinuity design and a field experiment are strikingly consistent. Contrary to expectations, signals of school quality decrease electoral support for the local incumbent. However, we find the expected effect among citizens for whom school quality should be most salient—parents with children in municipal schools. Using an online survey experiment, we argue that voters who do not value education interpret school quality as an indicator of municipal policy priorities and perceive trade-offs with other services. Voters may hold politicians accountable not only for their competence but also for their representation of potentially conflicting interests—a fact that complicates the simple logic behind many accountability interventions.Publication Information, oversight, and compliance: A field experiment on horizontal accountability in Brazil(2019-06-26) Toral, Guillermo; SSRN; https://ror.org/02jjdwm75Does the provision of information about local bureaucracies to the politicians who oversee them decrease irregularities and improve bureaucratic effectiveness? Information interventions are appealing because of their solid microeconomic foundations and their relatively low costs. However, recent experimental studies of information campaigns aimed at fostering vertical accountability (between voters and politicians) have found mixed results. Providing information to politicians directly could be more powerful, given politicians’ direct responsibility for allocating and managing resources. Information may be particularly effective when provided by auditing institutions, given politicians’ susceptibility to sanctions by these horizontal accountability actors. I partnered with the audit court of the Brazilian state of Rio Grande do Norte to experimentally study the effects of informing local politicians (both in government and in the opposition) about irregularities and performance in the bureaucracies they oversee. Outcomes are measured using administrative payroll data, a face-to-face survey of bureaucrats, and an online survey of politicians. Preliminary results suggest the treatment reduced the share of workers hired under temporary contracts, increased knowledge about rules among politicians, and changed politicians’ sense of accountability pressure from the state audit courtPublication Bureaucratic Politics: Blind Spots and Opportunities in Political Science(Annual Reviews Inc., 2023) Brierley, Sarah; Lowande, Kenneth; Potter, Rachel Augustine; Toral, Guillermo; https://ror.org/02jjdwm75Bureaucracy is everywhere. Unelected bureaucrats are a key link between government and citizens,between policy and implementation. Bureaucratic politics constitutes a growing share of research in political science. But the way bureaucracy is studied varies widely,permitting theoretical and empirical blind spots as well as opportunities for innovation. Scholars of American politics tend to focus on bureaucratic policy making at the national level,while comparativists often home in on local implementation by street-level bureaucrats. Data availability and professional incentives have reinforced these subfield-specific blind spots over time.We highlight these divides in three prominent research areas: the selection and retention of bureaucratic personnel,oversight of bureaucratic activities,and opportunities for influence by actors external to the bureaucracy. Our survey reveals how scholars from the American and comparative politics traditions can learn from one another. Copyright © 2023 by the author(s).Publication How Patronage Delivers: Political Appointments(John Wiley and Sons Inc, 2024) Toral, Guillermo; Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas; Lemann Foundation; https://ror.org/02jjdwm75The political appointment of bureaucrats is typically seen as jeopardizing development by selecting worse types into the bureaucracy or by depressing bureaucratic effort. I argue that political appointments also affect outcomes through a third,less studied channel,namely,by changing how bureaucrats work. Patronage provides connections between bureaucrats and politicians,and thereby grants access to material and nonmaterial resources,enhances monitoring,facilitates the application of sanctions and rewards,aligns priorities and incentives,and increases mutual trust. Political appointments can thus enhance bureaucrats’ accountability and effectiveness,not just for rent-seeking purposes but also,in certain conditions,for public service delivery. I test this theory using data on Brazilian municipal governments,leveraging two quasi-experiments,two original surveys of bureaucrats and politicians,and in-depth interviews. The findings highlight the countervailing effects of connections on bureaucratic governance in the developing world. © 2023 The Authors. American Journal of Political Science published by Wiley Periodicals LLC on behalf of Midwest Political Science Association.