Publication:
How Patronage Delivers: Political Appointments

Simple item page
dc.contributor.authorToral, Guillermo
dc.contributor.funderCentro de Investigaciones SociolĂłgicas
dc.contributor.funderLemann Foundation
dc.contributor.rorhttps://ror.org/02jjdwm75
dc.date.accessioned2024-07-08T13:14:58Z
dc.date.available2024-07-08T13:14:58Z
dc.date.issued2024
dc.description.abstractThe political appointment of bureaucrats is typically seen as jeopardizing development by selecting worse types into the bureaucracy or by depressing bureaucratic effort. I argue that political appointments also affect outcomes through a third,less studied channel,namely,by changing how bureaucrats work. Patronage provides connections between bureaucrats and politicians,and thereby grants access to material and nonmaterial resources,enhances monitoring,facilitates the application of sanctions and rewards,aligns priorities and incentives,and increases mutual trust. Political appointments can thus enhance bureaucrats’ accountability and effectiveness,not just for rent-seeking purposes but also,in certain conditions,for public service delivery. I test this theory using data on Brazilian municipal governments,leveraging two quasi-experiments,two original surveys of bureaucrats and politicians,and in-depth interviews. The findings highlight the countervailing effects of connections on bureaucratic governance in the developing world. © 2023 The Authors. American Journal of Political Science published by Wiley Periodicals LLC on behalf of Midwest Political Science Association.
dc.description.fundingtypeI am indebted to Ben Ross Schneider, Lily Tsai and Daniel Hidalgo for invaluable advice and guidance throughout the project. For useful comments I also thank Felipe Barrera-Osorio, Héctor Blanco, Sarah Brierley, Josh Clinton, Loreto Cox, Aditya Dasgupta, Emmerich Davies, Belén Fernández Milmanda, Charles Gale, Sandra Gomes, Merilee Grindle, Frances Hagopian, Kosuke Imai, José Incio, Junyan Jiang, Paul Lagunes, Horacio Larreguy, Noam Lupu, Nina McMurry, Virginia Oliveros, Agustina Paglayan, Jan Pierskalla, Ignacio Puente, Pia Raffler, Blair Read, Tesalia Rizzo, Fritz Sager, Christian Schuster, Alberto Simpser, Julia Smith Coyoli, Guadalupe Tuñón,Julie Anne Weaver and Liz Zechmeister; audiences at MIT, Harvard, UFRN, Vanderbilt, Yale-NUS, TEC, CIDE, Rutgers, NYU Abu Dhabi, ITAM, Northwestern, University of Gothenburg, WZB, IE University, UC3M, Georgetown, Oxford. APSA, MPSA, NEWEPS, PolMeth and REPAL; and three anonymous reviewers. Special thanks to the following 23 people, who provided excellent research assistance on the survey of bureaucrats: Jenair Alves, Marcos Aurélio Freire da Silva Júnior, Francymonni Yasmim Marques de Melo, Karoline de Oliveira, Raiany Juliete da Silva, Aline Juliete de Abreu Feliciano, Pedro Henrique Correia do Nascimento Oliveira, Ana Vitória Araújo Fernandes, Jaedson Gomes dos Santos, Ana Beatriz Germano Barroca, Renata Lima de Morais, Myleyde Dayane Pereira da Silva, Marina Rotenberg, Filipe Ramos Pinheiro, Daniele Vitória Lima da Silva, Elvira Gomes Santos, Matheus Oliveira de Santana, Magda Emanuele Lima da Silva, Ayanne Marília Sousa da Silva, Júlio César Nascimento, Lidiane Freire de Jesús. André Silva, and Pâmela Kaissa Fernandes Lopes. I also thank the State Audit Court of Rio Grande do Norte and in particular Gilberto Jales, Anne Carvalho, Victor Fernandes, Marcelo Araújo and Ilueny Santos, for making the survey of politicians possible. The Lemann Foundation, MIT GOV/LAB, MISTI and CIS provided financial support for fieldwork and surveys. Surveys and interviews were approved by MIT's Committee on the Use of Humans as Experimental Subjects (protocols 170593389, 1806407144, and 1810539206). Any errors are my own. This article was previously circulated under the title “The Benefits of Patronage: How Political Appointments Can Enhance Bureaucratic Accountability and Effectiveness.”
dc.formatapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.citationToral, G. (2024). How patronage delivers: Political appointments, bureaucratic accountability, and service delivery in Brazil. American Journal of Political Science, 68(2), 797-815.
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12758
dc.identifier.issn925853
dc.identifier.officialurlhttps://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85147263882&doi=10.1111%2fajps.12758&partnerID=40&md5=9391e9a0aa6fd809f8fa7f1d018ca0c2
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14417/3111
dc.issue.number2
dc.journal.titleAmerican Journal of Political Science
dc.language.isoeng
dc.page.final815
dc.page.initial797
dc.page.total23
dc.publisherJohn Wiley and Sons Inc
dc.relation.departmentComparative Politics
dc.relation.entityIE University
dc.relation.schoolIE School of Politics, Economics & Global Affairs
dc.rightsAttribution Non-Commercial 4,0 International
dc.rights.accessRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
dc.titleHow Patronage Delivers: Political Appointments
dc.titleBureaucratic Accountability
dc.titleand Service Delivery in Brazil
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.version.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.volume.number68
dspace.entity.typePublication
person.identifier.scopus-author-id36599451700
relation.isAuthorOfPublicationebc554d8-b4c5-4dc9-a13a-922d294cf59c
relation.isAuthorOfPublication.latestForDiscoveryebc554d8-b4c5-4dc9-a13a-922d294cf59c
Files
Original bundle
Now showing 1 - 1 of 1
Thumbnail Image
Name:
How Patronage Delivers Political Appointments, Bureaucratic Accountability, and Service Delivery in Brazil.pdf
Size:
1.47 MB
Format:
Adobe Portable Document Format
Download
Collections
Research Articles