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Dissolution Threats and Legislative Bargaining

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dc.contributor.authorBecher, Michael
dc.contributor.authorChristiansen, Flemming Juul
dc.contributor.rorhttps://ror.org/02jjdwm75
dc.date.accessioned2025-01-20T11:01:05Z
dc.date.available2025-01-20T11:01:05Z
dc.date.issued2014-09-09
dc.description.abstractChief executives in many parliamentary democracies have the power to dissolve the legislature. Despite a well-developed literature on the endogenous timing of parliamentary elections, political scientists know remarkably little about the strategic use of dissolution power to influence policymaking. To address this gap, we propose and empirically evaluate a theoretical model of legislative bargaining in the shadow of executive dissolution power. The model implies that the chief executive's public support and legislative strength, as well as the time until the next constitutionally mandated election, are important determinants of the use and effectiveness of dissolution threats in policymaking. Analyzing an original time-series data set from a multiparty parliamentary democracy, we find evidence in line with key empirical implications of the model.
dc.description.peerreviewedyes
dc.description.statusPublished
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dc.identifier.citationBecher, M., & Christiansen, F. J. (2015). Dissolution threats and legislative bargaining. American Journal of Political Science, 59(3), 641-655. https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12146
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12146
dc.identifier.issn1540-5907
dc.identifier.officialurlhttps://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.12146
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14417/3465
dc.issue.number3
dc.journal.titleAmerican Journal of Political Science
dc.language.isoen
dc.page.final655
dc.page.initial641
dc.page.total14
dc.publisherWiley
dc.relation.departmentComparative Politics
dc.relation.entityIE University
dc.relation.schoolIE School of Politics, Economics & Global Affairs
dc.rightsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
dc.rights.accessRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
dc.titleDissolution Threats and Legislative Bargaining
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.version.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion
dc.volume.number59
dspace.entity.typePublication
relation.isAuthorOfPublication64459ea7-0faa-4600-9041-a4f317ab9579
relation.isAuthorOfPublication.latestForDiscovery64459ea7-0faa-4600-9041-a4f317ab9579
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