Comments on Shan and Walter: ‘Towards a Set of Design Principles for Executive Compensation Contracts’

dc.contributor.authorBeaumont, Stacey
dc.contributor.authorReeb, David
dc.contributor.authorBoyle, Glenn
dc.contributor.authorBrown, Philip
dc.contributor.authorSzimayer, Alexander
dc.contributor.authorda Silva Rosa, Raymond
dc.contributor.authorHillier, David
dc.contributor.authorMcColgan, Patrick
dc.contributor.authorTsekeris, Athanasios
dc.contributor.authorHowieson, Bryan
dc.contributor.authorMatolcsy, Zoltan
dc.contributor.authorSpiropoulos, Helen
dc.contributor.authorRoberts, John
dc.contributor.authorSmith, Tom
dc.contributor.authorZhou, Qing
dc.contributor.authorSwan, Peter
dc.contributor.authorTaylor, Stephen
dc.contributor.authorWright, Sue
dc.contributor.authorYermack, David
dc.contributor.authorRatiu, Raluca Valeria
dc.contributor.rorhttps://ror.org/02jjdwm75
dc.date.accessioned2026-01-28T17:30:39Z
dc.date.issued2016-12-29
dc.description.abstractComment by Stacey Beaumont, Raluca Ratiu, and David Reeb: Is Ceo Pay High? CEO pay engenders substantial discussion in the popular press and among academics. The business press routinely contends that greedy and unethical CEOs obtain ‘gargantuan packages’ from ‘rubberstamping’ boards (MacDonald and Hughes, 2011, p. 233). Regulators and government officials often observe that CEOs make several hundred times the wage of the average worker and describe this as outrageous and immoral (Owen, 2009). Academic discussions often fall into two distinct categories. One category often focuses on managerial dominance or control of public firms. This managerial dominance group typically indicates that CEOs pervert the pay-setting process, enabling them to extract rents and therefore reward themselves with high compensation (e.g., Bebchuk and Fried, 2003). In contrast, the alternate group, the efficient contracting category, provides a rare talent hypothesis (e.g., Gabaix and Landier, 2008). This group posits that CEO ability represents an atypical skillset, leading to high pay in a competitive job market. Regardless of the underlying economic model of CEO pay, both groups agree that CEO pay is high.
dc.description.peerreviewedYes
dc.description.statusPublished
dc.formatapplication/msword
dc.identifier.citationShan, Y., & Walter, T. (2016). Towards a set of design principles for executive compensation contracts. Abacus, 52(4), 619-684 https://doi.org/10.1111/abac.12091
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1111/abac.12091
dc.identifier.issn1467-6281
dc.identifier.officialurlhttps://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/abac.12091
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14417/4079
dc.issue.number4
dc.journal.titleAbacus: A Journal of Accounting, Finance and Business Studies
dc.language.isoeng
dc.page.final684
dc.page.initial619
dc.page.total65
dc.publisherWiley
dc.relation.departmentAccounting & Management Control
dc.relation.entityIE University
dc.relation.schoolIE Business School
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rights.accessRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/
dc.titleComments on Shan and Walter: ‘Towards a Set of Design Principles for Executive Compensation Contracts’
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.version.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion
dc.volume.number52
dspace.entity.typePublication
relation.isAuthorOfPublicationc73ed561-278b-4b8e-8d4b-cc48241e4c98
relation.isAuthorOfPublication.latestForDiscoveryc73ed561-278b-4b8e-8d4b-cc48241e4c98

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