Publication:
How reported board independence overstates actual board independence in family firms: A methodological concern

Simple item page
dc.contributor.authorGoergen, Marc
dc.contributor.authorAnsari, Iram
dc.contributor.authorMira, Svetlana
dc.contributor.rorhttps://ror.org/02jjdwm75
dc.date.accessioned2025-03-18T16:33:38Z
dc.date.available2025-03-18T16:33:38Z
dc.date.issued2018
dc.description.abstractDespite successive codes of best practice of France, Germany and the UK highlighting the importance of the independence of non-executive directors, the codes tend to ignore the links that directors of family firms might have with the controlling shareholders. This is of particular concern for firms with concentrated family control as the risk of minority shareholder expropriation is greater for such firms. This paper proposes a new measure of board independence for family firms. Using a sample of listed French, German and UK family firms with an incumbent family CEO due for re-appointment or replacement over 2001-2010, we show that our measure of board independence is significantly lower than reported board independence. In contrast to reported board independence, our measure is a good predictor of the type of new CEO succeeding the incumbent CEO. Our results suggest that conventionally defined, or reported, board independence is biased and fails to provide investors, including minority shareholders, with an accurate measure of board independence. This conclusion has important policy implications for regulators and best practice in corporate governance.
dc.description.peerreviewedyes
dc.description.statusPublished
dc.formatapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.citationAnsari, I. F., Goergen, M., & Mira, S. (2018). How reported board independence overstates actual board independence in family firms: A methodological concern. Annals of Corporate Governance, 3(2), 81-183. http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/109.00000018.
dc.identifier.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1561/109.00000018
dc.identifier.issn2381-6724
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14417/3657
dc.issue.number2
dc.journal.titleAnnals of Corporate Governance
dc.language.isoen
dc.page.final183
dc.page.initial81
dc.page.total77
dc.publisherNow Publisher
dc.relation.departmentFinance
dc.relation.entityIE University
dc.relation.schoolIE Business School
dc.rightsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
dc.rights.accessRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/deed.en
dc.subject.keywordFamily firms
dc.subject.keywordCorporate governance
dc.subject.keywordCorporate control
dc.subject.keywordBoard independence
dc.titleHow reported board independence overstates actual board independence in family firms: A methodological concern
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.version.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion
dc.volume.number3
dspace.entity.typePublication
relation.isAuthorOfPublication55eb0faa-13da-4a35-a432-f529b62f4d8b
relation.isAuthorOfPublication.latestForDiscovery55eb0faa-13da-4a35-a432-f529b62f4d8b
Files
Original bundle
Now showing 1 - 1 of 1
Thumbnail Image
Name:
How reported board independence overstates actual board independence in family firms A methodological concern.pdf
Size:
1.14 MB
Format:
Adobe Portable Document Format
Download
Collections
Research Articles