Publication: Decision making under social interactions: processes and outcomes.
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Date
2021-05-26
Authors
Advisor
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Hadida, Allègre (PRESIDENTE);
Gonçalves Albornoz, Dilney (SECRETARIO);
Ulu, Canan (VOCAL);
Somasundaram, Jeeva (VOCAL);
Duan, Jason A. (VOCAL)
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IE University
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Abstract
In my dissertation I study two different types of decision making processes in the presence of social interactions. The first decision making process is investigated under uncertainty where I examine pricing decisions under an impending regime shift. Impending regime shifts representan uncertainty in the underlying state of the world that is susceptible to change. In such situations, decision makers must make probabilistic judgments of the change to arrive at the pricing decisions (i.e., willingness to pay/accept) for insurance and assets. I examine whether there is a gap between willingness to pay (WTP) and willingness to accept (WTA) and if the gap can be mitigated using social learning. To this end, a model is built integrating prospect theory with the system neglect hypothesis in chapter 1. Model predictions regarding WTA and WTP are validated using data collected through four controlled experiments. Based on this model, in chapter 2, two additional studies are conducted to examine the gap between WTP and WTA. To observe the effect of social learning on this gap, buyers-seller dyads are allowed to reveal their pricing decisions to each other over a multi period trading game. While a significant gap between WTA and WTP is observed, the effect of social learning on this gap is found to be insignificant. The second decision making process, outlined in chapter 3, is investigated under certainty (i.e., no risks involved) where I examine social interaction based choice formation for commodities. I analytically derive the average choice equilibrium of a socially interacting group using an expectation based choice model that incorporates group influences on individual decisions. Furthermore, I study if the equilibrium changes when firm actions (to influence individual choices) are introduced. Findings show that with firm actions, scenarios emerge where the choice equilibrium is self-defeating for the firm, specifically when decision makers are either privately indifferent between buying and not buying or they privately prefer not buy and only non-reference groups are present.
Unesco subjects
1209.04 TeorÃa y Proceso de decisión
1208.09 Subjective Probability
Estudio de Mercado
6309 Grupos Sociales
1208.09 Subjective Probability
Estudio de Mercado
6309 Grupos Sociales
License
Attribution 4.0 International
School
IE Business School
Center
Keywords
Citation
Guha, S. (2021). Toma de decisiones bajo interacciones sociales: procesos y resultados (Doctoral dissertation, Universidad Internacional SEK).