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Electoral Reform and Trade-Offs in Representation

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dc.contributor.authorBecher, Michael
dc.contributor.authorMenéndez González, Irene
dc.contributor.rorhttps://ror.org/02jjdwm75
dc.date.accessioned2025-01-14T12:59:08Z
dc.date.available2025-01-14T12:59:08Z
dc.date.issued2019-03-18
dc.description.abstractWe examine the effect of electoral institutions on two important features of representation that are often studied separately: policy responsiveness and the quality of legislators. Theoretically, we show that while a proportional electoral system is better than a majoritarian one at representing popular preferences in some contexts, this advantage can come at the price of undermining the selection of good politicians. To empirically assess the relevance of this trade-off, we analyze an unusually controlled electoral reform in Switzerland early in the twentieth century. To account for endogeneity, we exploit variation in the intensive margin of the reform, which introduced proportional representation, based on administrative constraints and data on voter preferences. A difference-in-difference analysis finds that higher reform intensity increases the policy congruence between legislators and the electorate and reduces legislative effort. Contemporary evidence from the European Parliament supports this conclusion.
dc.description.peerreviewedyes
dc.description.statusPublished
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dc.identifier.citationBecher, M., & González, I. M. (2019). Electoral reform and trade-offs in representation. American Political Science Review, 113(3), 694-709. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055419000145
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055419000145
dc.identifier.issn1537-5943
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14417/3446
dc.issue.number3
dc.journal.titleAmerican Political Science Review
dc.language.isoen
dc.page.final709
dc.page.initial694
dc.page.total16
dc.publisherCambridge University Press
dc.relation.departmentComparative Politics
dc.relation.entityIE University
dc.relation.schoolIE School of Politics, Economics & Global Affairs
dc.rightsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
dc.rights.accessRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
dc.titleElectoral Reform and Trade-Offs in Representation
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.version.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion
dc.volume.number113
dspace.entity.typePublication
relation.isAuthorOfPublication64459ea7-0faa-4600-9041-a4f317ab9579
relation.isAuthorOfPublication.latestForDiscovery64459ea7-0faa-4600-9041-a4f317ab9579
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