Publication:
Peer Versus Pure Benchmarks in the Compensation of Mutual Fund Managers

Simple item page
dc.contributor.authorEvans, Richard
dc.contributor.authorMa, LinLin
dc.contributor.authorGómez, Juan Pedro
dc.contributor.authorTang, Yuehua
dc.contributor.funderMinisterio de Economía y Competitividad
dc.contributor.funderAgencia Estatal de Investigación
dc.contributor.funderEuropean Regional Development Fund
dc.contributor.funderNational Natural Science Foundation of China
dc.contributor.rorhttps://ror.org/02jjdwm75
dc.date.accessioned2024-10-22T17:43:19Z
dc.date.available2024-10-22T17:43:19Z
dc.date.issued2023-11-06
dc.description.abstractWe examine the role of peer (e.g., Lipper manager indices) versus pure (e.g., S&P 500) benchmarks in fund manager compensation. We model their impact on manager incentives and then test those predictions using novel data. We find that 71% of managers are compensated based on peer benchmarks. Consistent with the model, peer-benchmarked fund managers exhibit higher effort generating higher gross performance and collect higher fee income. Analyzing advisors’ choice between benchmark types, we show that peer-benchmarking advisors cater to more sophisticated and performance-sensitive investors, and are more likely to sell through direct channels, consistent with investor heterogeneity and market segmentation.
dc.description.peerreviewedyes
dc.description.statusPublished
dc.formatapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.citationEvans, R., Gómez, J. P., Ma, L., & Tang, Y. (2020). Peer versus pure benchmarks in the compensation of mutual fund managers. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 1-38.
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1017/S0022109023001230
dc.identifier.issn1756-6916
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14417/3293
dc.journal.titleJournal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
dc.language.isoen
dc.page.final38
dc.page.initial1
dc.page.total38
dc.publisherCambridge University Press
dc.relation.departmentFinance
dc.relation.entityIE University
dc.relation.projectIDPGC2018-101745-A-I00
dc.relation.projectIDMCIN/AEI/10.13039/501100011033/FEDER
dc.relation.projectIDPID2021-125359NB-I00
dc.relation.projectID72103008
dc.relation.schoolIE Business School
dc.rightsAttribution 4,0 International
dc.rights.accessRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
dc.subject.keywordFund managers
dc.titlePeer Versus Pure Benchmarks in the Compensation of Mutual Fund Managers
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.version.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dspace.entity.typePublication
relation.isAuthorOfPublication4c2d4d21-bbf8-4935-96bc-6475146ceea7
relation.isAuthorOfPublication.latestForDiscovery4c2d4d21-bbf8-4935-96bc-6475146ceea7
Files
Original bundle
Now showing 1 - 1 of 1
Thumbnail Image
Name:
peer-versus-pure-benchmarks-in-the-compensation-of-mutual-fund-managers.pdf
Size:
268.12 KB
Format:
Adobe Portable Document Format
Download
License bundle
Now showing 1 - 1 of 1
No Thumbnail Available
Name:
license.txt
Size:
2.83 KB
Format:
Item-specific license agreed to upon submission
Description:
Download
Collections
Research Articles