The Limits of Public Support for Fiscal Consolidation: Survey Evidence From Great Britain

Abstract

In many European democracies, fiscal consolidation is back on the agenda. A common claim is that electoral constraints—stemming from public resistance to tax increases and spending cuts—limit policymakers’ ability to pursue deficit reduction. However, recent research suggests that public support for fiscal consolidation may be stronger than previously thought, calling this line of reasoning into question. This paper re-examines the issue in the British context. We find that, while a majority of respondents express support for fiscal consolidation in principle, only a minority prioritize it when faced with concrete trade-offs. Moreover, voters appear receptive to counter-narratives portraying public debt as sustainable and fail to link high debt levels to future economic hardship, undermining claims that this pro-consolidation minority will grow as fiscal conditions worsen. Overall, support for consolidation appears too shallow to generate pro-consolidation electoral incentives, even in a high-debt context. We discuss implications for future research.