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Endogenous Credible Commitment and Party Competition over Redistribution under Alternative Electoral Institutions

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dc.contributor.authorBecher, Michael
dc.contributor.rorhttps://ror.org/02jjdwm75
dc.date.accessioned2025-01-20T10:46:20Z
dc.date.available2025-01-20T10:46:20Z
dc.date.issued2015-12-09
dc.description.abstractPolitical parties competing in elections for the power to set public policy face the problem of making credible their policy promises to voters. I argue that this commitment problem crucially shapes party competition over redistribution. The model I develop shows that under majoritarian electoral rules, parties' efforts to achieve endogenous commitment to policies preferred by the middle class lead to different behavior and outcomes than suggested by existing theories, which either assume commitment or rule out endogenous commitment. Thus, left parties can have incentives to respond to rising income inequality by moving to the right in majoritarian systems but not under proportional representation. The model also generates new insights about the anti-left electoral bias often attributed to majoritarian electoral rules, and the strategic use of parliamentary candidates as a commitment device. I find evidence for key implications of this logic using panel data on party positions in 16 parliamentary democracies.
dc.description.peerreviewedyes
dc.description.statusPublished
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dc.identifier.citationBecher, M. (2016). Endogenous credible commitment and party competition over redistribution under alternative electoral institutions. American Journal of Political Science, 60(3), 768-782. https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12242
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12242
dc.identifier.issn1540-5907
dc.identifier.officialurlhttps://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.12242
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14417/3464
dc.issue.number3
dc.journal.titleAmerican Journal of Political Science
dc.language.isoen
dc.page.final782
dc.page.initial768
dc.page.total14
dc.publisherWiley
dc.relation.departmentComparative Politics
dc.relation.entityIE University
dc.relation.schoolIE School of Politics, Economics & Global Affairs
dc.rightsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
dc.rights.accessRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/deed.es
dc.titleEndogenous Credible Commitment and Party Competition over Redistribution under Alternative Electoral Institutions
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.version.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion
dc.volume.number60
dspace.entity.typePublication
relation.isAuthorOfPublication64459ea7-0faa-4600-9041-a4f317ab9579
relation.isAuthorOfPublication.latestForDiscovery64459ea7-0faa-4600-9041-a4f317ab9579
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