Publication:
Constraining Ministerial Power: The Impact of Veto Players on Labor Market Reforms in Industrial Democracies, 1973-2000

Simple item page
dc.contributor.authorBecher, Michael
dc.contributor.rorhttps://ror.org/02jjdwm75
dc.date.accessioned2025-01-24T14:36:47Z
dc.date.available2025-01-24T14:36:47Z
dc.date.issued2009-08-19
dc.description.abstractThis article investigates how veto players affect the reform of labor market policies in advanced industrial democracies. Complementing Tsebelis’s veto player model with the assumption of ministerial agenda control within the cabinet, the argument is that the constitutional and partisan distribution of veto power affects the capability of ministers to change the status quo in line with their partisan goals. This claim is tested with panel data on unemployment insurance entitlements and employment protection legislation in 20 OECD countries between 1973 and 2000. The central finding is that veto players constrain the power of ministers, cabinet ministers and prime ministers alike, to pursue their partisan interests. The partisanship of ministers shapes reforms only if the ideological distance between veto players is relatively small, and the influence of ministerial partisanship declines as ideological distance increases.
dc.description.peerreviewedyes
dc.description.statusPublished
dc.formatapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.citationBecher, M. (2010). Constraining ministerial power: The impact of veto players on labor market reforms in industrial democracies, 1973-2000. Comparative political studies, 43(1), 33-60. https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414009341716
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1177/0010414009341716
dc.identifier.issn1552-3829
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14417/3482
dc.issue.number1
dc.journal.titleComparative Political Studies
dc.language.isoen
dc.page.final60
dc.page.initial33
dc.page.total27
dc.publisherSage
dc.relation.departmentComparative Politics
dc.relation.entityIE University
dc.relation.schoolIE School of Politics, Economics & Global Affairs
dc.rightsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
dc.rights.accessRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/deed.en
dc.titleConstraining Ministerial Power: The Impact of Veto Players on Labor Market Reforms in Industrial Democracies, 1973-2000
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.version.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion
dc.volume.number43
dspace.entity.typePublication
relation.isAuthorOfPublication64459ea7-0faa-4600-9041-a4f317ab9579
relation.isAuthorOfPublication.latestForDiscovery64459ea7-0faa-4600-9041-a4f317ab9579
Files
Original bundle
Now showing 1 - 1 of 1
Thumbnail Image
Name:
Constraining Ministerial Power The Impact of Veto Players on Labor Market Reforms in Industrial Democracies, 1973-2000.pdf
Size:
626.07 KB
Format:
Adobe Portable Document Format
Download
Collections
Research Articles