Publication: Do proxy advisors add value to firm investors? an ownership perspective
Loading...
Date
2023-04-23
Authors
Advisor
Court
Aguilera Vaaques, Ruth (PRESIDENTE)
Castro Campbell, Julio Orlando de (SECRETARIO);
Crespí Cladera, Rafel (VOCAL);
Goergen, Marc Georges Jean (VOCAL);
Markus, Zellweger Thomas (VOCAL)
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
IE University
Defense Date
Metrics
Citation
Abstract
Proxy advisors (PAs), or information intermediaries that provide voting recommendations to investors, have gained visibility in the corporate governance landscape as external firm monitors. However, recent evidence suggests that the informational value of PAs is not the same across firms. Hence, their role in the shareholding voting process has come under increasing scrutiny. We advocate that the value of the PA as an external monitor cannot be assessed without considering the role of the other key internal monitor that participates in the shareholder voting process, that is, the Board of Directors, and without adopting an ownership perspective, as the Board voting advice will be largely influenced by who is the major owner of the company. Thus, we focus on family firms – a dominant group of concentrated firms with unique agency problems. We conduct three studies to understand how PAs help investors to evaluate the unique agency dynamics of listed family firms. In the first study, we examine the “PA-Board conflict” that arises when the PA recommendation is to vote differently from the Board; we also analyze its influence over investor dissent in listed family firms. In the second study, we explore the impact of the PABoard conflict over investor dissent in listed family firms that pay generous dividends to satisfy investors. Finally, in the third study, we investigate the influence of the “PA stamp” (i.e., when PAs recommend voting in the same way as the Board) over the value of concentrated firms, with a focus on listed family firms. Through the analysis of every voting proposal presented in Fortune 1000 firms; our studies provide insights into not only the role of the PA as an external firm monitor but also the value of the Board as an internal firm monitor. The studies also advance the understanding of the agency problems in listed family firms.
Unesco subjects
Gestión Financiera
Estructura del Mercado
Economía Internacional
Metodología Económica
Estructura del Mercado
Economía Internacional
Metodología Económica
License
Attribution 4.0 International
School
IE Business School
Center
Keywords
Citation
Laura, J. F. (2023). ¿Aportan los asesores de voto valor a los inversores? una perspectiva de la propiedad / Do proxy advisors add value to firm investors? an ownership perspective.